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Many interesting elements of supply and demand are starkly observable in professional
athletics.  Understanding institutional arrangements, competitive balance and labor-management
relations requires a basic understanding of sports labor markets and the struggle for control of those
markets between interest groups.  In this paper we treat historical and contemporary labor issues in
North America and Europe, from reserve rules and free agency, high levels of player pay and work
stoppages, to the distribution of playing talents across teams.
We discuss the relationship between personal productivity and pay; relative versus absolute
demand; competitive and cooperative interactions across firms (teams); factor substitutions; player
mobility and the Coase theorem.  We briefly consider how property rights affect supply, athletic
talent, arms races and restrictions on competition.
The problem of (excess) incentives to compete leading to externalities and inefficiencies are
noted throughout the paper.  Restrictive agreements such as reverse-order drafts, payroll caps and
revenue sharing may constrain these forces, but they also redistribute rents from players to owners.
All of these schemes, in one way or another, punish success.  The European approach -- promotion
of better-performing teams and relegation of those with the poorest records -- punishes failure.  It
remains an interesting economic question as to which system is better.
Sherwin Rosen
Department of Economics






Labor Markets in Professional Sports 
by 
Sherwin Rosen and Allen Sanderson 
Introduction 
  If one of the attractions of spectator sports is to occasionally see universal aspects of the 
human struggle in stark and dramatic forms, their attraction to economists is to illustrate 
universal economic principles in interesting and tractable ways.  Simon Rottenberg (1956) wrote 
the first serious economic analysis of labor markets in professional sports more than 40 years 
ago, and set the research outline for most subsequent work.  Focusing on American baseball, 
Rottenberg reviewed its industrial structure and contractual arrangements; discussed the 
implications of the reserve rule and player drafts on the distribution of playing talents, 
competitive balance, monopsonist exploitation and investments in training; and speculated about 
outcomes under alternative institutional arrangements, such as free agency for players and 
revenue sharing among owners.  
  The sporting world has changed a fair bit since then.  What was always a business has 
now become a much bigger business, with players’ salaries, franchise values, and stadium costs 
all shifted by orders of magnitude.  Free agency and revenue sharing in varying degrees have 
come to professional team sports in the United States and elsewhere, as have players’ agents and 
associations (unions), strikes and lockouts, restrictions on players’ salaries, and methods to 
constrain competition and improve competitive balance among teams.
1  Broader media 
considerations, especially television but also endorsements and product licensing, have become 
the tail that wags the revenue dog for professional team league sports, individual sports such as 
tennis and golf, the Olympic games and, in the United States, college athletics.  In addition, more 
                                                            
1Salary/payroll ceilings, revenue sharing and draft systems among teams are ubiquitous in North American team 
sports; promotion and relegation between major and minor leagues, which are designed to provide competitive 
balance incentives, are more prevalent in European leagues  See discussions below.  Szymanski,1999 and Hoehn 
and Szymanski, 1999 discuss these geographical institutional differences in detail.  
2 
attention has been paid in recent years to other labor market issues, such as racial discrimination 
and drug use among athletes.   
  Whenever a baseball star or soccer player is traded from one team to another, or signs a 
multi-year contract in excess of $10 million a year, or a golfer or race driver closes a multi-
million dollar endorsement deal with a well-known corporate entity, economists immediately 
recognize scarcity rents, but media attention is naturally focused on the reverse question of why 
these athletes make so much money.  The alleged impact that high salaries have on the ticket 
prices and/or the public financing of new facilities that are allegedly needed to generate 
sufficient revenues to pay huge salaries surface as important issues to fans and non-economists.  
And skeptics question the underlying societal values that condone and implicitly advocate such 
payments in light of pressing public needs for education, health care, eradication of poverty, and 
other social needs.  In addition to the issue of player pay itself is the complementary matter of 
the distribution of talent or “competitive balance” across teams in a league, brought to the 
forefront of discussion every time a team with the highest payroll, or an owner with the deepest 
pockets wins a championship, as in the case of New York Yankees in baseball or Manchester 
United in soccer.   
  Many basic elements of supply and demand are very clearly seen in sports labor markets.  
Many can and have been empirically investigated.  Sports is an outstanding forum for applied 
economics, but unusual and interesting twists of technology and institutional arrangements 
complicate analyses in various ways.  We use traditional demand, supply and market equilibrium 
analyses to analyze some problems in the economics of sports in what follows. 
  One other notable “supply side” effect is the increasing interest of economists, legal 
scholars, and other social scientists, especially in the last decade, in labor-management relations 
in sports.  Such newsworthy things as strikes, lockouts, or the level of players’ salaries turn one 
way or another on battles for control of the labor market between interest groups and the social 
institutions needed to keep them in check.  These struggles are often between owners and players 
over the disposition of revenues, but they can also be between two groups of players -- veterans  
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versus rookies, for example.  Legal restrictions and property rights are central components of 
sports economics today.  
 
The Demand for Labor 
  As Marshall pointed out, the demand for labor is derived from the demand for the 
ultimate goods and services that labor is used to produce.  Since customers are willing to pay 
more for higher quality athletic competition, the demand for players’ services depend on their 
marginal contribution to product quality.  Personal contributions in sports are relatively easy to 
observe and can be measured from a variety of data on past performances.  The simplicity of 
production functions in sports and the plethora of data indexing personal productivity in many of 
them help make the economic analysis of sports labor markets so interesting.  Professional sport 
is one of the few empirical cases where the marginal product of a player can be directly assessed.  
No signaling here. 
  Professional sports have an additional characteristic that is essential to their value: 
Consumers value direct interactions among purveyors, not each one on its own account.  Head-
to-head athletic competition ultimately determines the quality of teams or individuals within 
prescribed skill classes.  Observing skilled performance and the noncooperative competitive 
struggle to win is what makes sports so interesting to most people.  Sports outputs are not simply 
additive in the number of teams.  Instead, the distribution of inputs and their interactions across 
firms (teams) are important technological aspects of production and require special economic 
analysis.  For example, if one dimension of  “output” is victories, it is impossible to reallocate 
resources in a sports league to increase the number of wins: each time one team wins a contest, 
its opponent loses, and the total number of victories is unchanged.  
  The contest aspects of sports imply that the value of one player depends on the services 
rendered by others.  Two kinds of interactions must be distinguished.  Within team 
complementarities are easy, between-team complementarities are harder to deal with.    
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  The fact that one player’s value depends on the talents of other members of a given team 
is no different from the usual problem of bundling complementary goods.  The quality of a meal, 
for example, depends on how well the individual courses are coordinated.  Just as restaurant 
owners choose their menus to cater to customer tastes for meals, team composition is efficiently 
chosen by the self interests of team owners and players working through standard market forces. 
  But performance statistics are not the only determinants of value.  In the entertainment 
services of which sports are an increasing part, production is labor intensive and the final product 
is not easily separated from the people who render the service.  Economic “output” often 
includes direct valuation of the inputs themselves.  Thus some star athletes develop personal 
followings that go well beyond their contribution to the quality of specific competitions.  “Star 
quality” is often elusive and harder to extract from simple statistics, but fans apparently 
recognize it when they see it.  It can have enormous effects on sports revenues (Hausman and 
Leonard, 1998). 
  The harder question is how complementarities between teams affect allocations of talent.  
This has no counterpart in conventional supply analysis because in sports supply decisions 
among relevant units jointly determine consumer values.  Since demand depends on the nature 
and quality of competition among groups of producers, there is a sense in which the league is the 
natural “firm” in organized sports.  If a league configured teams geographically and allocated 
players among them to maximize its total revenue, between-team complementarities would be 
efficiently internalized (like those within-teams).   
  But the industrial organization of sports is not well described by economic competition 
for consumers among leagues.  Usually one or two leagues account for the lion’s share of the 
business and have some degree of monopoly power.  And  leagues are more loosely organized 
around separate ownership of teams that compete against each other on the playing field and in 
the labor market for talent.  Owners (and fans) of individual teams are selfish, even though they 
share some common interests.  Since the competitive struggle and uncertainty of outcomes are  
crucial to spectator interest, surely commercial interest and demand would be smaller if teams in  
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leagues were commonly owned and directly coordinated.  Among other things, the outcomes 
might appear to be “fixed” or “rigged.”
2  Thus interactions between teams to some extent present 
common pool externality problems.  The ways in which between-team externalities are 
coordinated by the business organization of sport and the nature of property rights give these 
activities a unique economic character.
3  (See Gilbert and Flynn, 1999 for a discussion of leagues 
as joint-production ventures.) 
  Sporting contests inevitably are hierarchical.  Contests among poorly matched com-
petitors are of little interest.  The outcome is hardly in doubt and the quality of play is poor when 
one contestant is much better than the other.  Perhaps due to the difficulties of establishing 
market price mechanisms for efficiently decentralizing the allocation of teams to each other, or 
due to adverse selection arising from the fact that lower quality competitors tend to free-ride on 
higher quality rivals unless given incentives not to do so (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), virtually all 
sports rely on entry exclusions or external rules that assign competitors to mutually exclusive 
quality categories or leagues.
4  When leagues establish payroll caps or ceilings on player 
compensation, they usually set minimum compensation or floors as well, which serve to 
discourage free-riding by weaker franchises. Teams in the premier, top-rated professional league 
generate the most fan interest because they represent the highest quality of play.  Both relative 
and absolute quality in athletic contests determine their spectator value. 
                                                            
2This is also why wagering by players, managers/coaches, or owners poses such a threat to the integrity of the game 
-- and its ticket revenues -- and is so severely punished. 
3Periodically, beginning early in the 20th century, proposals that would in effect have one single-entity ownership 
structure, with players then allocated across teams by the league itself have come -- and gone.  The MSL (Major 
Soccer League) in the United States is currently organized in this fashion.  In addition to the advantage of allocating 
players to maximize league revenues, it also avoids potential antitrust problems -- it is theoretically impossible to 
collude with oneself, while a league comprised of several individual and independent owners is always subject to the 
charge that some joint decisions constitute violations of the Sherman Act.  
4One of the most interesting self-regulating mechanisms for efficient sorting of competitors is claims races in horse-
racing.  Since any horse in a claims race can be purchased at the stated claiming price, owners are deterred from 
putting “ringers” in the race (Hall, 1990).  Nonetheless, claims races usually impose past-performance conditions 
that ration entrants as well.  
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  Total revenue in many sports is highly concentrated among the top contestants.  But the 
contestable quality of sport itself does not explain this fact.  High concentrations of business 
among small numbers of sellers are commonly observed in many entertainment services.  Think 
of artists, writers, musicians and actors; or of computer software and patent drugs for that matter.  
Economies of scale account for why business tends to be so concentrated in these activities.  The 
cost of production (a performance, or the basic invention) is largely independent of the size of 
the audience; most of the costs are up-front, so average cost is decreasing in consumed output.  
Large venues and various media allow many paying spectators to simultaneously observe a 
sporting event, while at the same time enabling teams to exclude nonpaying customers.  Few 
sellers are need to serve the entire market.  Television has increased the scope of these activities 
in recent decades.  An event like the World Cup championship match attracts a remarkably large 
audience all over the world.  Men’s professional basketball, a major sport in North America in 
recent years, is produced by 29 teams with no more than 12 players per team.  The top leagues in 
the four major sports in the U.S., with a total of 118 teams, only employ about 3,000 professional 
athletes. 
  Because sports are so labor intensive, scale economies are what make potential earnings 
so large.  However, they do not guarantee high salaries.  Scarcity of the most talented players is 
necessary for rent to be observed, else wages would be driven down to opportunity costs (e.g., 
the average production worker wage in expected present value).  The marginal revenue product 
of a particular player is the extra price that a spectator is willing to pay times the number of 
people who are attracted, either in person or on television.  What we tend to see in professional 
sports markets (and in other entertainment services such as movies, as well as in patent drugs, 
computer software and investment banking) is that the audience-quality gradient is very steep 
and heavily concentrated on the best contestants, but the unit price-quality gradient is relatively 
flat.  One of the ways that top performers attract such large audiences is by not gouging on price.  
Instead, they get the lion’s share of rents by attracting most of the customers.  Lower quality  
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sellers get small pickings because market competition effectively prices them out of the market 
(Rosen, 1981).   
  Before getting to the productivity evidence, a perennial popular confusion between the 
social value of sports and the enormous salaries paid to some well-known athletes is worth 
noting.  How can it be that a soccer star earns a hundred times more than a school teacher?  Isn’t 
teaching far more important to society than playing recreational games for money?
5  Certainly it 
is.  This is proven by the fact that total spending on professional sports in a modern economy is 
extremely small compared to the amounts spent on education and most other things.  A typical 
fan values education many times more than any sport is valued.  Many parents in the U.S. 
routinely spend $15,000 - $20,000 per year to send their children to private schools.  Hardly 
anyone pays anything near that amount to observe sporting events.   
  The explanation for the salary differences lies in a “personal scale of operations” effect in 
sports compared to teaching and most other jobs (Mayer, 1960).  A teacher’s income is bounded 
by the small number of students who can be taught in one classroom.  Though the unit value per 
student is very high, the possibility of earning a large income is small because the scale of a 
teacher’s personal business is sharply constrained.  In sports, unit values of each customer are 
tiny, but that is more than offset by the huge personal volume of business that a player generates 
from the scale economy.  A star player is worth only a few dollars more per spectator than an 
ordinary player.  There are lots of spectators.  Since the total market value is divided among a 
very small number of players, the stars make their fortunes on “low mark-ups” but “high 
volume.”  The total revenue generated by a typical American baseball team (the national 
pastime, at least at one time) is about the same as that of a moderate sized department store -- not 
the entire chain, but just one store! (Noll, 1974)  But in sports the value-added is almost equal to 
                                                            
5In 1929, Babe Ruth, the greatest American Baseball player, earned  $70,000.  The sum was well publicized and far 
in excess of any other player.  An indignant reporter asked Ruth to justify how he could possibly be worth 
substantially more than what the President of the U.S. earned.  Ruth is reported to have said: “I had a better year.”  
Reflating his salary to dollars in 2000, the result would be modest by comparison to the $10M or more annual 
salaries paid to superstars today, even though few of them have had better years than Ruth did in 1929.  
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total revenue and most of the cost is player compensation.  Except for the capital costs of a 
stadium or arena, purchased material inputs are trivial.  There is no anomaly here.  It’s all in the 
technology.
6  When and if teachers use the Internet and other media to personally teach millions 
of students at one time, star teachers will earn at least as much as star athletes.  No doubt the few 
who are employed will work some economics of sports into their lectures. Some writers of 
elementary texts are rumored to approach star royalty status already. 
 
Factor Substitutions 
  Opportunities to substitute other factors of production for labor in sports are more limited 
than in most other industries, but they are not non-existent.  While there always have been, and 
will likely continue to be, nine players on a side in baseball, for example, the use of a ‘designated 
hitter’ in one of the two league divisions both in the United States and Japan has changed inputs 
slightly, as has more reliance on ‘middle relievers’---baseball pitchers who are, on average, less 
expensive than either starters or ‘closers.’
7  Modifications in American football from time to time 
change the strategic value of (and hence the demand for) place kickers relative to runners, 
receivers and/or quarterbacks.  The advent of the three-point shot in basketball and the strictness 
with which fouls are called changes the relative importance and worth of extremely tall, 
muscular players relative to their smaller, more agile perimeter shooters.  Professional boxing 
could, following the Olympics, require headgear, which would reduce injuries to and prolong the 
careers of participants if boxing talent were considered truly scarce.  The classic speed and close 
teamwork of traditional ice hockey have been replaced with more bruising defense and 
individual styles of offense in the modern game. 
                                                            
6The high-salaries-societal-values conundrum in sports is a contemporary example of the age-old water-diamond 
paradox: prices (or wages) are determined at the margin, while value is, at a minimum, price times quantity. 
7Some substitutions are derived from technology and periodic changes in strategies, such as reliance on power 
versus speed (or vice versa); these are changes in what players do, rather than substitutions in the usual sense.  
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  In other instances, “non-player” inputs are complementary: In road racing there is only 
one driver per car, but the difference between winning and losing can depend on the quality of 
the entire team, including mechanics, engineers, and pit crews; in addition to players on the field 
or court, team sports employ coaches/managers, scouts, and trainers; given intricate and 
sophisticated salary-cap and payroll-cap rules that apply in many North American team sports, a 
good accountant and savvy general manager can be worth several victories a year; and golfers, 
skiers, cyclists, tennis players and runners look for any possible advantage with the latest 
innovations in equipment.   
  As incomes rise and the line between sports and entertainment blurs, the quality of a 
stadium’s amenities, including an array of upscale refreshments, promotional items, mascots and 
cheer leaders, museums and displays, gift shops, instant-replay features on scoreboards and more 
comfortable seating, takes on more importance and the contest itself less.  The group and social 
aspects of fan participation reduce the demand for the players relative to the set of 
complementary activities inside the arena. 
 
Pay and Marginal Value Product          
  Wage regressions are used to study how a person’s pay is related to personal skill and 
human capital.  Most wage data don’t contain direct information on performance.  Instead, 
personal productivity is approximated by education, work experience, IQ, family connections 
and the like, measures that largely affect wages by influencing occupational choice.  Studies of 
interpersonal wage differences within occupations are few and far between for that reason.  
Sports are almost unique in affording the opportunity to measure specific work performance on a 
narrow set of jobs.  Empirical studies inevitably find that better performing professional athletes 
earn more money.  Most of the work to date has used U.S. data. 
  Still, the economic issues are complicated by the legal organization of labor markets in 
professional sports.  It is elementary that a person’s pay is proportional to marginal productivity 
in a competitive, open market for labor services.  But sports labor markets traditionally have  
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been neither competitive nor open.  Until relatively recently, U.S. professional teams where 
salaries have been studied made long-term, exclusive contracts with players and they alone had 
the legal right to transfer performance rights of players to other teams.  In modern American 
labor experience, this system (called the “Reserve Clause” in baseball or “option clause” in other 
sports) was almost unique to sports.  Giving teams exclusive property rights to the human capital 
of workers is unconstitutional in most other activities, but baseball was exempted by a Supreme 
Court ruling in 1922 (and reaffirmed by later Courts, in 1953 and 1972; see footnote 19).
8  One 
of the few other areas where exclusive contracts were the norm was also in the entertainment 
services.  In the early Hollywood Star system, movie studios made exclusive, long-term contracts 
with a repertory of actors for movie performances, ostensibly for similar reasons (see below).  
Court challenges eliminated the Star System in the 1940s.  
  Rottenberg (1956) described the reserve contract system in American baseball as a form 
of monopsony.  And so it was.  That a player could only negotiate with the team which owned 
his contract did not entirely eliminate the player’s bargaining power, but greatly constrained it.  
The initial signing of a player was open and competitive, but signing bonuses typically were (and 
remain) heavily discounted by initial uncertainty about a player’s long-term talent and potential.  
From then on the player’s market opportunities in the sport were restricted to his current team or 
to the team to which his contract was transferred.
9  Bargaining leverage could only come from 
threatening to shirk or to quit the game.  A team would be rash to make a good player unhappy, 
and even more rash to make a very good player unhappy.  These agency considerations help 
explain why wages were related to performance, but surely wages would be higher in a contract 
system where players owned their contract rights and could negotiate freely with all teams in the 
league.  Recent history has proven this point many times over.   
                                                            
8Soccer and other North American team sports do not enjoy baseball’s legal exemption, though  in most cases each 
league has a basic labor agreement that is negotiated and approved by players and owners; it covers collective 
bargaining and other job-related issues. 
9As a predictable byproduct, the reserve clause increased competition among teams for new talent.  This competition 
and the resulting escalation of signing bonuses for new players was eliminated when the league adopted an amateur 
draft system about 50 years ago.  
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           There is another prescient insight in Rottenberg’s paper, though perhaps more implicit 
than overt, that the ownership of player performance rights would have no effect on the 
allocation of player talent to teams.
10  The logic follows the general economic principle that 
unrestricted markets transfer resources to their highest valued uses.  If teams owned the 
contracts, a player’s contract would be sold for a capital sum if the player had greater value to an 
alternative team than to the current employer.  If players owned their contracts, they would go to 
the same teams via the usual route of direct salary competition, because the team with the highest 
value would be willing to pay the highest wage.  Therefore, to a first approximation contract 
property rights have to do with who gets the rent on talent, not with who plays for whom.  To the 
extent that the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960) applies to sports, the real, dead-weight cost 
misallocations of monopsony relative to player allocation are eliminated.  There has been much 
less work on how changes in contract ownership rights have affected player allocations across 
teams, than on how their wages were affected.   
  All evidence points to remarkably large effects of contract ownership rights on player 
salaries.  The evidence is of two kinds.  One is qualitative evidence on the effects of greater 
inter-league competition in a particular sport (Sanderson and Siegfried, 1997).  The other is 
quantitative estimates of what happens to salaries of individual players before and after an 
exogenous change in contract law for athletes. 
  North American football and basketball are examples of the first kind.  The premier 
National Football League (NFL) was slow to expand the number of teams when television first 
made an impact on increasing the demand for the sport in the early 1960s.  A rival and 
independent American Football League (AFL) was created and successfully competed for talent 
and paying customers, particularly television viewers.
11  Within a matter of years, the quality of 
play in the new league was as good as in the old one.  Competition for talent between rival 
                                                            
10The point is formally proved in El Hodiri and Quirk, 1971, and Quirk and El Hodiri, 1974.  
11Cave and Crandall, 1999 provide a more detailed treatment of broadcasting issues in professional sports.  
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leagues drove up the salaries paid to players in both.  In their fundamental wisdom to rein in 
“ruinous competition,” the rival leagues merged.  Competition for new talent was tightly 
controlled by a unified draft (in which a new player could only bargain with the single team that 
drafted him, no longer with separate teams in rival leagues).  Salaries stopped rising and may 
have fallen.  A similar story applies to the rival American Basketball Association (ABA) and 
veteran National Basketball Association (NBA).  At its inception, the well-financed ABA 
recruited many star college players and produced many innovations in the game.  Merger of the 
two leagues controlled competition at the draft entry point and salaries stopped rising so rapidly 
for a time.  Similar patterns have been observed in European football when leagues within 
countries removed restrictions on the number of foreign players allowed on teams and court 
decisions restricted transfer fees among teams. 
  Detailed statistical studies of how competition changed the relation between pay and 
performance of individual players provides more quantitative evidence. These studies usually 
focus on performance statistics, but are not exclusively confined to them.  Personal 
characteristics of players, especially race, have been an important emphasis of these studies in 
the U.S. and will be considered separately.  But these studies also discovered important outliers 
in the data–a class of players whose salaries were way out of proportion to their statistics.  
Extreme positive outliers were identified as “stars.” This raises interesting issues about the true 
determinants of personal productivity because the consumer value embodied in stars cannot be 
described precisely.  Most of the statistical specifications are linear or semilog, so these effects 
might reflect nonlinearities in the mapping of performance statistics to productivity.  For 
instance, sometimes a little edge can have large effects on winning.  However, they also likely 
reflect some players’ personal followings built up over a career for reasons that are difficult to 
measure in performance data.  For instance, memories of past performances attract fans to see 
the aged stars, not necessarily their current productivity on the team.  A recent study presented 
evidence that these capital goods elements are important for many older players (Horowitz and  
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Zappe, 1998).  The effects of race are also suggestive that there is more to it than just abstract 
notions of playing performance.  
  A major innovation in these studies was made by Scully (1974), who devised a neat way 
to impute marginal products in baseball.  Scully’s method postulates winning team performance 
as the product output valued by consumers.  There is a very close correlation between win 
percentages in baseball and total team revenues, so this is a reasonable approximation.  Team 
output (win percentage over the season) is related to team performance measures in a production 
function.  Wins are regressed on offensive statistics (such things as batting averages and runs 
scored per game) and defensive statistics (such as fielding averages and runs allowed per game).  
The production function implies estimates of the marginal products of these offensive and 
defensive “inputs.”  The relationship between wins and revenues implies estimated  marginal 
revenue products (MRP) for these team statistics.  Finally, assuming the usual addivitity in the 
relationship between team and individual performance statistics in the win-production function, a 
marginal revenue product can be estimated for each player.  These imputed marginal revenue 
products are compared to actual wages paid, usually by another regression. 
  The relationship between actual and estimated marginal products before the reserve 
clause was eliminated showed that actual wages were deeply discounted relative to marginal 
revenue product (Scully, 1974).  The extent of the discount is slightly disputed, but wages were 
somewhere between 20-to-50 percent of MRP in those days.  Wages were greatly compressed 
and much of the ability rent of star players was transferred to owners.  After the  reserve clause 
was eliminated, the relationship changed markedly (Scully, 1989; MacDonald and Reynolds, 
1994).  The salary-quality gradient increased substantially and stars received their full rents.  The 
data now show very close correspondence between wages and estimated MRP for experienced 
players who have achieved free agency status and can bargain with a variety of teams.  There is 
no discount at all for them.  However, pay falls short of estimated MRP for very inexperienced 
players (rookies).  This is related to the well-known labor market observation that variation in 
starting wages in a profession is much smaller than variation in wages of more experienced  
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workers: not only are latent talent differences hard to identify among new entrants, but players 
also eventually differentiate themselves by their work ethic and abilities to learn.  Players who 
have established themselves, but who have not yet reached free agent status fall somewhere in 
between.
12   
  Only a few studies so far have examined inter-team mobility of players.  The strong 
Coase theorem prediction of no effect is somewhat disputed by the evidence.  Quirk and Fort  
(1999) begin to examine evidence on patterns of relative baseball team final standings in league 
rankings before and after the reserve clause. They find no differences.  Krautmann and 
Oppenheimer (1994) examine player mobility directly.  While their evidence is not 
overpowering, there is some evidence that free agency has been associated with greater mobility 
of players among teams.  The issue is complicated by the fact that endorsements and future 
career prospects out of sports or in allied activities such as broadcasting now play a significant 
role in total compensation for many players.  An imputation must be made for player preferences 
for teams and added to total rent to properly invoke the Theorem in this instance.
13  The 
allocation of players among teams should maximize total team rents plus consumer surplus of 
players.  For instance, if a player is worth more to team A than to team B on revenue account but 
the player prefers city B to city A, a trade from B to A should only occur in the old contract 
system if the player was willing to pay the owner of team B the difference in revenue by working 
                                                            
12While the percentage of players who move across teams each year in the U.S., whether through trades or the 
exercise of free agency options, is greater now than when there were more restrictions, there appears to be less 
trading of players in North America than in Europe, where the transfer market is quite active each season, making it 
more likely that wages reflect MRPs.  Each North American league, as a result of bargaining between owners and 
players, has “stages” of free agency, based on years of service or age.  See Sanderson and Siegfried (1997).  In part 
as a reaction to Oakland A’s owner Charles Finley’s selling of his star players in the 1970s, there are prohibitions, or 
at least customs, against sales of players for cash in the U.S. but not in Europe.  
13Kirby Puckett, the perennial all-star center fielder for the Minnesota Twins allegedly signed contracts for lesser 
amounts to play his whole career with that one team.  Ken Griffey, Jr., one of baseball’s current premier players, has 
expressed a strong interest, once he becomes a free agent in 2000, in playing for a team closer to his family -- in 
Florida -- rather for his current team, the Seattle Mariners, almost a continent removed from his home.  Frequently 
players will sacrifice some income to play for a team that has a better chance of competing for a championship; 
slugger Reggie Jackson took a nominal pay cut to play for a better team -- the New York Yankees -- but also to have 
access to the larger endorsement market in New York.  
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for a lower wage.  With costless bargaining, the rent maximizing solution is always attained 
irrespective of the property right.  The player preference component of rent probably increased 
after free agency was established, and this ‘outside cause’ could have affected player mobility 
even if legal contract forms had not been changed.  However, much more work on this issue 
remains to be done. 
 
Wage Discrimination in Sports 
  An important application of the pay-productivity relationship in sports with broader 
applications to other labor markets is how salaries vary by race.  This American dilemma is of 
broad economic interest because sports are increasingly international, with players arriving at the 
big markets from far flung and unfamiliar places.  Two aspects of the question have been 
prominent in the labor economics of sport in the U.S.. First, to what extent have nonwhite 
American athletes been paid less than whites with the same record of performance?  Most studies 
of race (or sex) discrimination rely on gross indicators of human capital such as education and 
age, and these can differ among groups for reasons unrelated to discrimination.  Sports labor 
markets allow more precise inferences and raise deeper questions about the determinants of 
personal productivity from the point of view of team revenues.  Second, why have minorities 
been excluded from big-league sports in the past?  Sports typically are held up as  paragons of 
meritocracy, personal accomplishment and freedom of entry.  “May the best player win” has not 
always applied in sports.  Color and nationality bars sometimes have been blatant.
14 
  Generally speaking, the color bar in American sports was broken after World War II.  
Prior to that time most professional team sports were totally segregated, and the top leagues were 
                                                            
14A third aspect of discrimination has considered segregation by position.  Allegedly  minority athletes have been 
under-represented, relative to their overall proportions on teams, at what are deemed the “skill” positions, such as 
quarterback in football or pitcher and infielders in baseball.  A related issue of considerable debate in the United 
States currently is the relative lack of minorities in coaching and “front office” management positions, especially in 
leagues such as basketball and football where African-Americans constitute two-thirds to 80 percent of all active 
players.  See Scully (1989 and 1995) for more on position segregation and managers in baseball.  
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exclusively white.
15  Of all the sports, accounts of integration of American baseball have been the 
most extensive (e.g., Tygiel, 1983).  Baseball was entirely segregated until 1947.  Today, whites 
are a minority relative to their numbers in the U.S. population, and large numbers of Latin-
American players are among the biggest stars in the game.  Asians are starting to appear in 
significant numbers.  How these changes came about is a complex story, but there is little doubt 
that the development of extraordinarily talented minority players, whose market opportunities 
were severely limited by segregation or few opportunities abroad had something to do with it.  
Similar considerations apply to the increasing international character of some sports teams in 
Europe.  There is evidence to support the idea that minority players who first integrated 
American professional sports were significantly better than the marginal, if not the average 
majority players (Scully, 1989).  Today the same things appears to be true in English football. 
  To summarize broadly from the large number of empirical studies in what is perhaps the 
most intensively researched empirical area in the economics of sports, wage discrimination 
among U.S. athletes was easily detected in the initial studies of the 1960's and 70's, but had 
mostly disappeared by the 1990's.
16  The basic method uses performance measures to adjust wage 
differences for differences in talent, and then adds dummy variables for race and their 
interactions with performance to detect discrimination.  It is difficult to find a negative 
regression coefficient on race in U.S. data these days.  Relative proportions of minority athletes 
in the major sports follow these wage trends very closely.  Relative supply clearly responds to 
financial incentives: minorities tend to avoid activities where wage discrimination is common 
because returns on human capital investments are lower than in areas where discrimination is 
less common.   
  What are the sources of past discrimination in sports?  Wage discrimination results from 
                                                            
15Boxing was integrated much earlier, though racial considerations played a large role in marketing the sport in the 
U.S..  Boxing is not a team sport, but other individual sports such as golf and tennis only have begun to exhibit 
substantial minority participation in relatively recent times, well after most team sports were integrated. 
16Well known studies for baseball include Gwartney and Haworth (1974) and Scully (1974 and 1989).  These and 
others are surveyed by Kahn (1992).  Kahn (1991) presents a comprehensive survey for basketball and other sports.  
17 
tastes for discrimination by either employers, employees, or customers (Becker 1971).  Wage 
differences appear as the natural market response to tastes (or more properly, distastes) because a 
worker’s personal characteristics cannot be detached from the rendering of services and must be 
valued in assessing total personal productivity.  Wage discounts are an equalizing difference 
necessary to compensate discriminators for the disutility they suffer in dealing with people they 
don’t like.  Undoubtedly all three sources have been involved in sports at one time or another, 
though players and owners alike could and have argued that final customers were the ultimate 
source   If fans disliked the idea of integrated teams they would pay smaller ticket prices to see 
them play and integration would reduce profits unless wages of minorities were sufficiently 
small. Otherwise, segregation would dominate the general market equilibrium outcome.  
  Scale economies inherent in the conveyance of sporting events to fans make consumer 
tastes for discrimination an especially severe problem for minorities.  Only a little taste for 
discrimination by each customer can eliminate entirely a minority athlete’s market.  For although 
each fan is willing to pay only a trivial discount if a minority player is present, it is the total 
discount attributed to all fans as a group that must be compensated by wage differences in order 
for the derived demand for minorities to be positive.  When the number of fans is large, as it is in 
the big sports, there is no feasible wage cut that a minority player can take to compensate owners 
and other players for the revenue loss at the gate.   
  Yet racial or national preferences are only part of the story.  Fans like to see their team 
win, so for given wages, a minority player can compensate for discriminatory preferences by 
being sufficiently more talented to outweigh racial preferences.  The black players who 
integrated baseball in the 1950's were by and large major talents who proved themselves many 
times over.  Today, the equal opportunity, meritocracy myths cherished by the sports community 
are more or less a reality in the U.S..
17  Similar issues apply to the international players who 
                                                            
17Two interesting studies support the idea of customer discrimination in the U.S.. Kahn and Scherer found that 
attendance at basketball games was negatively affected by the percentage of black players on a team, cet. par., and 
that the loss of gate receipts was a remarkably accurate predictor of black/white salary differences.  Nardinelli and 
Simon (1990) examined the market for baseball cards collected and traded by fans, and found evidence that cards of 
star black players traded for a discount relative to comparable whites.  More recent studies of markets in later years  
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crossed national boundaries to play for European teams. Using on-field results and data on investor 
returns from English League soccer, Szymanski (2000) found evidence for racial discrimination by 
demonstrating that teams with higher proportions of black players enjoyed higher levels of performance 
after controlling for payroll expenditures. 
  
Supply 
  Labor supply in professional team and individual sports is determined by the usual list of 
suspects: given one’s natural talents, attitudes toward risk and personal discount rate, 
occupational choice is determined by career prospects in a field and nonpecuniary aspects of a 
particular job relative to other career options.  Individual choices between work and leisure, and 
thus how much labor to provide to a market at various wage rates; the nature of training and how 
much education or training to acquire, and who pays for it; and, finally, post-retirement options 
are also important.  But like many aspects of demand, in sports some of these issues manifest 
themselves in bold relief compared to other labor markets.  Moreover, the competitive 
technology of sports raises externality issues akin to ‘arms races’ that have few counterparts in 
the general labor market. 
 
Sources of Supply and Training 
  An athlete’s potential begins to show and needs to be developed at very young ages.  But 
there is also great uncertainty in outcomes.  Large financial risks are inevitable, given the small 
number of top players who provide most of the services to customers.  Think of the thousands of 
seriously talented amateur club or school athletes who reach maturity each year and the 
remarkably small number of players employed in the top leagues of all sports.  In the U.S.  
perhaps 30 new players are talented enough to make it into 320 player roster of the NBA in a 
year, and those 30 players started out as more than 10,000 high school seniors who then became 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
find that these discounts have disappeared along with salary differences (Bodvarsson and Brastow, 1999; Gabriel, 
Johnson and Stanton, 1995).  
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less than 1,000 freshman players at Division I universities.  Some go to the European leagues, 
etc., but even those slots are few and far between.  High risk is not specific to sports.  It is 
common in other forms of entertainment talent such as musicians, and in many nonhuman capital 
investments, such as research and development, all for similar reasons.  Most attempts to break 
into the top echelons in such professions result in failure.  In sports it is even more risky because 
playing careers are so short--less than five years for most athletes.  Among those who are 
successful and make it all the way to the top, it is rare for a big league athlete to earn as much as, 
say, $10 million over a playing career.  Data are not available to calculate meaningful success 
probabilities for a potential entrant, but they are vanishingly small---so small as to make the 
expected present value of potential entrants to grab the brass ring look like a pittance.   
  Does this mean that people who attempt to enter these professions are giddy risk lovers 
with unrealistic assessments of themselves?  Perhaps, but not necessarily.  It is instructive to 
analyze entry into such risky activities as a sequential search or stopping problem.  Entrants 
receive continuous feedback based on their past performance.  Information on their prospects 
changes over time and allows them to reassess their chances at each stage.  When the record gets 
sufficiently unfavorable, they quit and do something else.  Therefore, the small chance for a big 
prize at the end lends a certain “option value” to entry (much like the standard value of an option 
in finance), because the loss is truncated by the option to quit and walk away (Rosen, 1986).  
Less talented people usually are weeded out quickly in sports and other high risk occupations.  
They have time to switch to more realistic careers and do not expose themselves to great income 
risk.  Many who continue longer have successful careers in ancillary activities such as coaching. 
  In the United States, the supply of athletic talent for professional individual and team  
sports comes from two main sources: minor league ‘farm’ systems or tours (as in tennis and golf) 
and colleges and universities.  From their outset, professional sport leagues (and, in the United 
States, in college athletics as well) have instituted a variety of arrangements or restrictions 
among owners that affect the employment of players and their distribution across teams and 
impact the supply side of labor markets.  Contracting institutions that restrict player mobility  
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initially through a draft and/or later through some type of reserve system, have implications for 
whether the employer or the employee pays for the investment in an athlete’s skill development.  
    Before the advent of free agency (see below), owners had substantial incentives to 
underwrite the development and training of new talent.  They supported extensive scouting 
systems to find players and maintained elaborate minor-league training systems to develop their 
skills.  As in the Hollywood Star system, where the studios developed unknown talent, lost 
money on most prospects, but made it up by signing long-term exclusive contracts and limiting 
payments to the successes, an important rationale for the reserve system in North American 
baseball was to give owners economic incentives to invest in training.  The main skills in sports 
are general to the game, not specific to a team.  Yet under a reserve system, running minor 
league teams at a loss is effectively a team-specific investment, if the owner has exclusive rights 
to contract with successful players and can hold down their wage rates.  When free agency came 
along and monopsony power was greatly reduced, owners’s training investment incentives fell 
drastically.  Human capital investments became general rather than firm-specific, so players bore 
more of these costs and earned more of the benefits.  There was less financial support for minor-
league teams, players’ salaries in the training leagues were lower, and/or the costs were shifted 
elsewhere.  Intercollegiate athletic programs serve as the primary training grounds for 
professional baseball, basketball and football, and increasingly for ice hockey in North America 
today. 
 
The Quality of Labor Supplied: Investments and Arms Races 
  Although journalists and fans frequently complain about the quality of today’s 
professional athletes, there is ample evidence to suggest that players and the quality of play are 
better than in the past.  Swimming and track and field records continue to be broken, and 
qualifying times for Olympic events and marathons are more stringent each year.  Team sport 
athletes are bigger, stronger, and faster than their predecessors, and they are in better physical  
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condition.  And technology, in the form of equipment, training facilities and knowledge of 
human body mechanics, has improved athletes’ efficiency.  
  Given restrictions on the supply of teams, as a percentage of the underlying population, 
however measured, today’s professional athletes also represent a smaller percentage of the 
potential labor pool, which also suggests a higher average quality.
18  In addition, a variety of data  
suggest that variation in quality has also declined.  All this is consistent with rising supply price 
of athletic talent.  Weaker competitors have been weeded out as higher salaries, produced by a 
combination of increased demand and fewer restrictions on salaries, have induced more 
athletically-inclined youths to consider careers in professional sports -- and allowed employers to 
be more selective.  And their new property rights as free agents have increased the incentives for 
players to develop their skills, increase their playing life and stay in shape.  The opportunity cost 
of not being in shape -- and thus being replaced by someone else -- has risen dramatically. 
  Yet certain relative aspects of supply are important in sports.  If the average quality of 
talent is higher than ever before, what also matters to fans is the relative quality of play among 
competitors.  Surely both absolute and relative quality are important.  On the one hand, 
spectators want to see high quality performances and pay a large premium to do so in the major 
leagues compared with the minors.  On the other hand, they want their favorite team to win.  
This relative performance aspect of output, though not unique to sports, is very important to it.  
Part of the demand for sport is the resolution of uncertainty about who is best and, for many fans, 
the desire to be associated with a winning team.  
  Rank order considerations that determine outcomes can create excessive personal 
incentives to improve one’s skills: a player with greater skills imposes negative externalities on 
rivals because others must react defensively to preserve their relative ranking.  In most other 
labor market contexts, the decision of one person to acquire more human capital has only 
                                                            
18The skill level required also means that there is much more specialization from earlier and earlier ages, which 
reduces the labor pool to some extent. As a matter of practical impossibility, athletes can no longer engage in more 
than one activity at a time, as Roger Bannister was able to accomplish in 1954 when he broke the four-minute-mile 
barrier in track while a full-time medical school student.  
22 
pecuniary externalities on others:  personal decisions are properly internalized by market prices.  
In sports, the attempts of one player to gain a competitive advantage puts direct pressure on 
rivals to keep up.  Since each contestant does not value the extra costs imposed on others, there is 
much “rat race” potential in sport (Akerlof, 1976).  An extreme case is when the customer value 
of the contest is completely relative and depends exclusively on rank of contestants (Frank and 
Cook, 1995), that is, on who wins irrespective of skill or quality of play.  In this case any attempt 
by contestants to improve their skills is a pure arms race and socially wasteful.  Arms limitations 
treaties are necessary to avoid excess build-up of skill.  Of course when absolute quality 
considerations totally dominate value, these investments are socially efficient (Lazear and Rosen, 
1981) and arms limitation is unwarranted.  In sports the truth usually lies somewhere in-between.  
Lately some economists have stressed the rank and relative aspects of competition rather than the 
skill or quality of performance aspects, but empirical evidence on the extent of overinvestment is 
lacking.  Nor has anyone spelled out how it could be ascertained. 
  The most frequently cited example of excessive competition today is the use of 
performance-enhancing drugs.  These may have longer run negative side effects on athletes and 
often are thought to lend unfair advantage compared to enhancing performance in more 
traditional ways.  Well-publicized accounts of athletes’ alleged use of drugs are used to illustrate 
the traditional opposition to unnatural advantages: runners Mary Decker Slaney and Ben 
Johnson; 1996 Olympic swimming medalist Michelle Smith; 1998 and 1999 Tour de France 
winners, Marco Pantani and Lance Armstrong, respectively; home-run champion Mark McGuire. 
There is a problem here, but it is hard, if not impossible, to draw the line or define what 
constitutes excessive competition versus a “level playing field” developing athletic skills and 
performance, where the margin of victory, and thus the difference between financial riches and 
bare existence, can be measured in hundredths of seconds, inches or one less golf stroke out of 
nearly 300. 
  Some runners train at high altitudes; others are children of professional athletes and thus 
have an inherent head start, encouragement, and access to more in-house coaching; many  
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athletes with the financial resources to do so employ their own conditioning and/or psychological 
trainers.  More than a few success stories hinge on overbearing parents who nevertheless 
provided their children with an early start, a factor of immense benefit in sports, entertainment 
and many other professions; some have lower opportunity costs and practice for longer hours, 
while others are more impervious to pain; and discounts rates, personal values and risk 
preferences vary across competitors
19.  In each of these cases, one athlete’s attempt to gain an 
advantage over another requires his or her competitors to follow suit in one way or another, yet 
no test-ban treaties are invoked to limit them.  And some contestants must depend on medical 
treatments to compete at all, though this too presumably imposes costs on other competitors who 
would otherwise take their place on the court or fields of play.  The incentive to gain competitive 
advantage is a major source of innovation in sports, but has not been studied very much.  The 
economic issues are most closely related to patent races in economics, but raise lots of interesting 
new issues.  The problem has interesting and suggestive parallels in evolutionary biology and 
survival of the fittest. 
 
Unionization, Collective Bargaining, and Free Agency in Sports 
  Prior to the 1970s in the United States, there were significant restrictions on athletes’ 
mobility across teams in the major professional sports leagues.  Until the December 1995 
Bosman ruling against the transfer system and limits on foreign players by the European Court of 
Justice, the same was true in Europe.  One can date the beginning of player freedom with the 
appointment of a talented, assertive executive director of the players’ association in baseball in 
1966, their first collective bargaining agreement in 1968, the advent of limited salary arbitration 
in 1970, and the untested decision of two players to play the 1975 season without a contract, 
                                                            
19Some drug use, such as Olympic snowboarders in Nagano, Japan, in 1998 and among professional basketball and 
football players in the United States, does not enhance performance but is merely recreational.  Nevertheless, 
governing officials tend to disqualify athletes who use these substances as well.  
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which ultimately led an arbitrator to rule, and the courts to uphold that decision, that the two 
were free to sign with any other club.
20 
  Unlike most other unions, players’ associations in North America and Europe do not 
negotiate salaries for their individual members.  That is handled by the player himself, generally 
through an agent.  The associations do bargain collectively over working conditions, pension 
benefits and insurance, grievance procedures and, in North America but not in Europe, league-
wide arrangements such as a minimum salary, any direct restrictions on total payrolls or 
individual salary caps, or owners’ incentives to compensate players (“luxury taxes” in baseball).  
Players’ associations have generally opposed plans by owners to cap payrolls, and owners have, 
especially after the dissolution of reserve systems, proposed various schemes to restrict open 
bidding for players:  the NBA instituted a payroll cap for the 1983-84 season (and beyond); 
football (the NFL) followed suit in 1993; Major League Baseball’s unsuccessful attempt to force 
a cap in 1994 ultimately led to the players’ strike of 1994-95, and it ended with the owners 
nevertheless getting a second-best outcome, a (“luxury”) tax on payrolls that exceeded specified 
levels.  Associations have also generally opposed widespread revenue sharing among owners.  
Reducing the incentive to win decreases the value of players and thus would, as demand for their 
services declines, lead to lower average salaries. 
  Basic labor agreements in each sport, which generally run for three to seven years and are 
then renegotiated, require players and owners to bargain freely over salaries (baseball owners’ 
failure to abide by this agreement, when they colluded not to bid for veteran free agents in 1986-
88, ended with a $280 million fine).  Breakdowns in negotiations have led to periodic strikes by 
players -- most recently in 1987 in the National Football League and 1994-95 in Major League 
                                                            
20Baseball had instituted a reserve system (termed an “option clause” in some other sports) in the 1870s, whereby 
players were bound to one team for as long as that team chose to offer them another in a series of one-year contracts.  
In the Federal Baseball case in 1922, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed baseball’s antitrust exemption and 
corresponding legality of its contractual arrangement with players.  In 1953, deciding for a club and against a player 
in the Toolson vs. New York Yankees case, the Court reaffirmed that exemption, though with less enthusiasm; in a 
5-4 vote in the 1972 case of Flood vs. Kuhn, upheld the exemption, though by then association efforts were well 
underway to create free agency through other means.  
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Baseball -- or lockouts by the owners and leagues -- 1994 in ice hockey (NHL) and 1998-99 in 
basketball (NBA).   
  For the last thirty years sports unions have been largely successful in their bargaining 
with owners.  The short careers of players and smaller numbers and more homogeneity among 
owners tilt negotiations toward management.  However, unions benefit from the relatively 
inelastic supply of highly skilled athletic talent coupled with the nature of the games, which 
greatly limit normal substitutions of other inputs for labor.  And, of course, they benefit from the 
presence of and increase in monopoly profits these sports cartels generate, which creates the 
spoils over which they can then attempt to bargain.  One area in which player unions have not 
been successful, in negotiations or in court, is the elimination of draft systems (which originated 
in the professional football in the 1930s to prevent competition among owners for star players), 
through which the initial property rights to a player reside with one team and one team only for a 
set number of years, which thus postpones competition for that player’s services and can 
function almost as a quasi-monopsony in some instances because playing careers are so short 
(that is, a player may never reach the free-agency stage of his career before being replaced by a 
new, younger, non-free agent substitute).       
 
Wages and Competitive Balance 
  A variety of restrictive agreements recently struck among team owners in the major 
North American sports restrict salary escalation of top players.  Perhaps it is coincidence that 
league attempts to restrain salaries have come at a time when the demand for sport and players’ 
salaries have grown so much.  Salary caps impose ceilings on wages paid to individual players; 
payroll limitations restrict total wage expenses per team, but do not directly constrain the wage 
of any particular player; and luxury taxes impose surcharges on teams whose payrolls exceed a 
certain amount while distributing the proceeds to teams with smaller payrolls.  In no other labor 
markets are employers collectively allowed to impose restrictions on payments to workers.  
26 
  Economic thinking on this issue has changed over the years.  The reserve option contract 
in sport was widely recognized by owners and others as a mechanism to restrict salaries.  It was 
claimed that an open market for player services would allow “rich” teams in the large markets to 
grab all the talented players, leaving little left over for the “poor” teams and their fans in smaller 
markets.  Athletic competition allegedly would degenerate into groups of “haves” and “have 
nots.” Games would be unfair and boring, and fan interest would wane unless these forces were 
contained.  As discussed above, viewing this claim in terms of the Coase Theorem proves that it 
seriously flawed.
21  Though player mobility may have increased to some extent after free agency 
was established, other market forces also contributed to greater mobility.  Most importantly, 
there has been no overwhelming change in the structure or persistence of team inequality in final 
team standings over time.  And many sports franchises sell for huge sums today, in spite of their 
large payrolls. 
  Perhaps one day Political Economy will sort out how franchise owners have managed to 
impose reserve option restrictions in the past and salary limitation treaties today.  The main 
intellectual interest in the topic currently does not so much stress the political struggle for 
property rights as the problem of externalities among teams.  We have flirted with the issue at 
various points in this paper.  The new argument is another variant of the Arms Race—a 
manifestation of the curious combination of cooperation and competition that is inherent in 
professional sports.  If there are returns to beating other teams, each owner’s private demand for 
talented personnel may be excessive because each wants to get the winning edge.  Presumably, 
private bidding would escalate star salaries above their social products.  This particular form of 
“cut-throat” competition can be controlled by salary caps, etc.  
  The economic issues revolve around the fact that consumer demand depends on interteam 
competition and rivalry.  A self-interested team would never acquire so much talent as to make 
its games predictable and dull: this is just an example of the fact that the marginal value of one 
                                                            
21See Fort and Quirk, 1995 for a very good discussion of these issues.  
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team’s quality depends on the quality of other teams.  In a sense there is nothing unusual here.  
After all, the marginal product of labor in a neoclassical production function depends on the 
amount of capital, and conversely.  Market prices and competition for labor and capital ensure 
that social and private margins are equated and that decentralized decisions are efficient. In 
sports it is useful to think of the contest as output and teams as inputs that produce the output.  
Efficient decentralization dictates that the teams themselves compensate each other for the joint 
value they collectively add to the game.   Externalities arise when the prices faced by teams for 
services rendered are set improperly; creating inefficient incentives for individual teams to gain a 
competitive edge in the talent market.  Efficient transfer prices among teams would eliminate the 
inefficiency. 
  One-off sports like boxing illustrate efficiency of contract. Shares of the gate are 
individually negotiated for each match, depending on the relative strengths, reputations and 
drawing power of opponents.  Promoters often offer big name boxers minimum payment 
guarantees. The nature of contracting is much more complicated in team sports, because regular 
competitive trials are scheduled over an entire season and transfer prices must be set in advance 
among all teams in the league.  This challenging economic problem has not been fully analyzed, 
but it seems probable that the efficient solution gives greater compensation to stronger teams 
based on their record (e.g., standings last year or, after the season is along, standings to date).  
Details might be expected to vary depending on the nature of the game.  Gate sharing 
arrangements differ wildly among professional team sports, but we are unaware of systematic 
analysis of their efficiency properties.  Given the concerns that are often voiced about balance 
issues, some current arrangements might well be inefficient. 
  In a sense, salary cap and other treaty-like solutions “solve” sports externality problems 
in much the same way as prohibitions and quotas “solve” environmental externalities.  But tariffs 
are economically superior to quotas. Until some progress is made on more thoroughly 
understanding the larger decentralization problem, it is difficult to analyze these arrangements.  
For example, luxury taxes reduce team incentives to stockpile talent, but reward teams for  
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weakness.  The efficient arrangement has to achieve the proper balance between these two 
forces.  Salary and payroll caps reduce the market demand for superior talent, as does the unified 
draft system. All schemes used in the United States punish excellence in one way or another.  
The European football approach punishes failure by promoting excellent minor league teams to 
the majors and demoting (relegating) poor performing major league teams back down to the 
minors.  The revenue loss from a potential demotion to a lower class of play is severe 
punishment for low quality---severe enough that salary treaties, league sharing arrangements, 
and unified player drafts are so far thought to be unnecessary, even though star salaries are 
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